Frozen Conflicts in International Law

Part II: Case Study—Overview

This section presents an overview of the four cases of frozen conflicts: South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each conflict’s history and recent developments will be addressed. A basic understanding of the conflicts will be provided that allows for further analysis of their frozen status. Two preliminary remarks must be made. First, we cannot cover the regions’ complex histories in full and shall focus only on the most relevant facts. However, unlike most of the literature dealing with the four cases, we do not start only with the Soviet Union’s disintegration in the 1990s but also examine earlier historical roots that contributed to the conflicts. Second, sometimes facts are hard to identify, if they exist at all and are not merely interpretations, as Nietzsche suggested. In frozen conflicts, as in every conflict, each side has its own interpretation of history, shaped by ideologies and emotions. Literature discussing the conflicts in question thus often explicitly distinguishes between the perspectives of the two sides when outlining the origins of the conflict.¹⁷⁵ This approach will also be adopted here when necessary.

I.South Ossetia

The Republic of South Ossetia, sometimes styled the State of Alania,¹⁷⁶ is located in the centre of the Caucasus, in the north of Georgia and bordering the Russian region of North Ossetia. Covering 3900 square kilometres, it comprises little more than 5.6 per cent of the Georgian territory.¹⁷⁷ South Ossetia and North Ossetia are both inhabited by Ossetians, who are recognized as a people.¹⁷⁸ The two regions are divided by the Caucasian mountains. In 1989, the — S. 36 —population was at 98,527.¹⁷⁹ Migration and forced dislocation have lowered this number; recent population estimates vary between 53,000¹⁸⁰ and more than 56,000.¹⁸¹

A.History

The conflict in and about South Ossetia is embedded in the history of Georgia and its relations with Russia. The origins of Georgia’s national identity date back to the fourth century and the foundation of an autocephalous Georgian church, followed by the development of its own language and alphabet in the fifth century.¹⁸² A distinct Georgian Christian culture and civilization emerged during the time of the United Georgian Christian Kingdom from the eleventh to the thirteenth century.¹⁸³ Throughout the centuries, the region of today’s Georgia was home to various ethnic groups and entities with their own cultures, traditions, and languages or dialects. The Ossetians are one of these and have their ethnic and linguistic roots in what is today Iran.¹⁸⁴ Heterogeneity is characteristic not only of the population of Georgia but also of its politics: Georgia has been characterized by phases of unification and fragmentation and by a wide variety of political entities. It has been a mosaic of different political entities with varying degrees of autonomy, and throughout the centuries, external powers such as Mongolia, Ottoman Turkey, and Safavid Persia have repeatedly invaded and controlled parts of the land.¹⁸⁵

Russia entered the Black Sea region in the second half of the eighteenth century seeking greater political influence. Interestingly, it was the Ossetians that invited them: after centuries of isolation, the Ossetians emerged in 1774 when a delegation travelled to St. Petersburg and asked Empress Catherine the Great to incorporate their land into the Russian Empire,¹⁸⁶ a fact that is rarely mentioned in literature. Nine years later the Georgian King Erekle II followed the Ossetians in asking Russia for protection against Turkish and — S. 37 —Persian invasions. They concluded the Treaty of Georgievsk, which declared eastern Georgia, including South Ossetia, as a Russian protectorate.¹⁸⁷ However, Russia did not defend Georgia when Persia invaded once more in 1795.¹⁸⁸ When Georgia requested support from Russia again while trying to find an agreement with Persia, Russia answered by proclaiming the annexation of the Georgian kingdom, including South Ossetia.¹⁸⁹ The consequences were protection against external enemies, the unification of a fragmented land, and social progress at the price of Russification and denationalization, including the subordination of the autocephaly of the Georgian Church to the Russian Orthodox Church.¹⁹⁰ Russia and Georgia have their own understanding of this event, considering it a progressive step bringing civilization to the region¹⁹¹ or a fatal distortion of Georgia’s development, respectively.¹⁹²

In the Tsarist period, Georgia was under Russian military administration initially and became fully integrated in 1881, which led to increased Russification. The region of Ossetia was troublesome and rebellious, as the peasants who inhabited the mountain region refused to fulfil duties to their lords, and numerous uprisings took place in the first half of the nineteenth century.¹⁹³ The peasants were mainly Ossetians belonging to Georgian aristocratic families.¹⁹⁴ In reaction to the uprisings, Russia separated the problematic region from Georgia as a distinct district under military control. This entity was dissolved again in 1849 and divided into two entities: North Ossetia became part of the Vladikavkaz Military District, and South Ossetia became part of the Tiflis Governorate.¹⁹⁵ South Ossetia remained a rural area with limited industrialization. The suppression of South Ossetian peasants by the Georgian aristocratic families to whom they had to pay taxes for the use of land remained.¹⁹⁶ A chasm developed, across which social class correlated with ethnicity.¹⁹⁷ In 1920, as Georgia rejected Bolshevik ideology, Ossetians participated in uprisings — S. 38 —against the upper class and fought for the independence of their region but were brutally crushed by the Georgian army, with thousands of deaths.¹⁹⁸ Part of the Ossetian population was expelled and deported—events that are frequently referred to as ‘genocide’ in the public and political discourse of South Ossetia.¹⁹⁹ What started as a social conflict turned into an ethnic one between Ossetians and Georgians.²⁰⁰

With the collapse of the Russian Empire, Georgia became independent as the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918. This entity existed for three years and was in control of South Ossetia.²⁰¹ In February 1921, the Red Army invaded Georgia and established the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic (Georgia SSR). The rebellions and bonds of Ossetians with the Bolsheviks continued, and South Ossetia declared its autonomy, a move that was not recognized by Georgia.²⁰² In April 1922, the Ossetian Autonomous Oblast was declared within the Georgian SSR.²⁰³ North Ossetia also became an autonomous oblast within the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (Russian SFSR). The two Ossetias aimed to merge into a single political entity and even presented a petition to Stalin in 1925, which was clearly rejected.²⁰⁴ The situation of the Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia was complex: no clearly defined borders remained from the entity of the Tsarist period, nor did all ethnic Ossetians within the Georgian SSR live in this specific region.²⁰⁵ The boundaries were drawn from scratch by the Bolsheviks, and expelled Ossetians were able to return to their land.²⁰⁶ During the Soviet era, South Ossetia’s status was never upgraded, whereas its counterpart North Ossetia turned from an autonomous oblast to an autonomous republic within the Russian SFSR in 1936.²⁰⁷ Ironically, today the small and economically weak South Ossetia is acknowledged as an independent state by Russia while the bordering North Ossetia, with its much larger population and economy, is ‘only’ an autonomous republic within Russia.²⁰⁸

The relationship between South Ossetia and Georgia was mostly peaceful throughout the Soviet era; or at least tensions were hidden.²⁰⁹ Only in the late 1980s did the relationship obviously become more tense. Whilst South Ossetian officials complained about cultural and linguistic oppression, Georgia criticized the region’s disloyalty.²¹⁰ Violence broke out in 1989 following the speech in which the Georgian leader Gamsakhurdia referred to the minorities living in Georgia as ‘guests’ and proposed that South Ossetians should go ‘back to their homeland’ in North Ossetia.²¹¹ South Ossetia declared its sovereignty as a Soviet Democratic Republic within the USSR on 20 September 1990, but this was abolished by Georgia.²¹² In March 1991, South Ossetia voted in favour of the preservation of the USSR, whereas Georgia voted against it and consequently declared its independence on 9 April 1991.²¹³ In January 1992, South Ossetia voted for independence from Georgia and its incorporation into Russia; this was refused by both Georgia and Russia.²¹⁴ South Ossetia held on firmly to its independence and declared it again in May 1992, but the entity was not recognized as a state by any other state. In parallel to the dissolution of the Soviet Union between 1990 and 1992, a violent conflict evolved that caused thousands of casualties and displaced thousands of people.²¹⁵ The situation was stabilized through a ceasefire agreement, the Sochi Agreement, signed on 24 June 1992 by the Georgian leader Shevardnadze and the Russian president Yeltsin.²¹⁶ They agreed on the withdrawal of all armed formations, demilitarization of the region, the formation of a joint control commission, and a peacekeeping force. In 1994, the Agreement on Further Development of the Georgian-Ossetian Peaceful Settlement Process and on the Joint Control Commission between Georgia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and Russia further consolidated the situation.²¹⁷ In 1996, the Memorandum on Measures of Providing Safety and Strengthening of Mutual Confidence between the Sides in — S. 40 —the Georgian-Ossetian Conflict was signed in Moscow by Georgia, Russia, South Ossetia, North Ossetia, and the CSCE (the predecessor of the OSCE).²¹⁸ They agreed that the use of force is no means of conflict resolution and that they would continue negotiations with the aim of achieving full-scale political settlement.²¹⁹ The process was supported not only by the CSCE Mission in Georgia but also by the EU offering assistance for post-conflict economic rehabilitation.²²⁰ These mediation efforts managed to keep the conflict relatively calm, or frozen,²²¹ for about a decade. However, it became increasingly evident that a resolution of the conflict was unlikely in the near future.²²² Over this period, state-building in South Ossetia progressed steadily, with a legislature and courts being established and presidential elections conducted.²²³

In the 2000s, the conflict intensified. The growing antagonism between the US and Russia over NATO expansion in Eastern Europe and the declaration of independence by Kosovo from Serbia in February 2008 were contributing factors.²²⁴ In April 2008, Russia expanded its cooperation with South Ossetia in areas such as trade, economy, social issues, science and technology, information, culture, and education.²²⁵ In July 2008, Georgia and South Ossetia launched artillery attacks on each other’s villages and checkpoints.²²⁶ The conflict escalated in August when Georgia and Russia launched military operations. The responsibility for the war starting on 7 August 2008 remains disputed.²²⁷ What is certain is that the events in August 2008 occurred within broader developments over a longer period.²²⁸ The IIFFMCG found in its report (also called the Tagliavini Report) that Georgia’s on-the-spot reactions against Ossetian troops before 7 August 2008 were necessary and proportionate, but its subsequent actions did not qualify as self-defence.²²⁹ Conversely, — S. 41 —South Ossetia’s military operations were justified as self-defence until 12 August 2008, but subsequent operations were not, due to the absence of any ongoing attack by Georgia.²³⁰ Finally, Russia’s intervention in the war was considered contrary to the prohibition of the use of force, despite attempts at justifying it as humanitarian action, aimed at protecting nationals abroad, and at the invitation of South Ossetia.²³¹ During the short war, the separatists, backed by Russian forces, recaptured territories on the periphery of the region that had come under Georgian control in 2004.²³² The war ended officially with the adoption of the EU-brokered Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement between Russia and Georgia on 12 August 2008,²³³ but violence continued even after that date.²³⁴

Prior to 2008, an independent state of South Ossetia had not seriously been discussed. Neither the constitution of the USSR²³⁵ nor that of the Georgian SSR²³⁶ nor that of post-Soviet Georgia²³⁷ allowed for its secession. The international community recognized Georgia’s independence and accession to the UN on 31 July 1992 and included South Ossetia as an integral part of its territory. UN Resolution 1808 of April 2008, by which point tensions had already heightened, reaffirmed the commitment of all member states to the integrity of Georgia’s territory, including South Ossetia.²³⁸ Yet following the war in 2008, a few states recognized South Ossetia’s statehood: Russia and Nicaragua in 2008; Venezuela and Nauru in 2009; the microstates of Vanuatu and Tuvalu in 2011, which revoked their recognitions in 2013 and 2014, respectively; and Syria in 2018. South Ossetia had been recognized by its allies Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh in 2006.²³⁹ Therefore South Ossetia’s right to self-determination and secession was suddenly discussed under international law. However, this right has been denied, and the putative state remains largely — S. 42 —unrecognized.²⁴⁰ In the words of the IIFFMCG, South Ossetia is considered an entity ‘short of statehood’.²⁴¹ Discussions on South Ossetia’s putative independence take into account its dependence on Russia, which has increased since the war in 2008 and been further formalized through treaties and agreements, particularly on military and strategic cooperation.²⁴² Georgia considers Russia’s course of action a creeping annexation of its territory.²⁴³

B.Recent Developments

The present situation in South Ossetia remains tense for various reasons. First, the core issue of the conflict remains unresolved: while Georgia stresses its territorial integrity including South Ossetia, bolstered by international law, South Ossetia de facto forms a state that insists on its independence and is supported at various levels by Russia. Moreover, the area remains highly militarized by Russian troops that have never been withdrawn even though this has been proposed in several agreements.²⁴⁴ While this militarization is in accordance with South Ossetia’s de facto authorities, Georgia has never consented. Russia has even increased the number of troops and placed its personnel of the Fourth Military Base in South Ossetia.²⁴⁵ Russia exercises overall control over the separatist armed groups.²⁴⁶ A fence of 80 km has been built in the last decade separating the region from Georgia in a process termed ‘borderization’.²⁴⁷ More land is gradually added by moving the fence, for instance by just a few meters overnight.²⁴⁸ The region is highly dependent on Russia in various respects. For example, in 2018, 86% of South Ossetia’s 7,672 million rouble state budget, 6,592 million roubles, came from Russia.²⁴⁹

This financial assistance has enabled some economic growth in the region; however, the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of South Ossetia is inferior to that of Russia, Georgia, or North Ossetia.²⁵⁰ People living in South Ossetia are also closely linked to Russia personally. Large-scale extraterritorial naturalizations by Russia, termed ‘passportization’, have played an important role in increasing dependence on the patron state ever since 2002.²⁵¹ Moreover, nearly all political positions in South Ossetia are held by ethnic Russians.²⁵²

The war in Ukraine that started in 2022 has widened the political gulf between South Ossetia and Georgia. While it has brought South Ossetia even closer to Russia, it has brought Georgia closer to the West. South Ossetian officials called for accession to Russia after the beginning of the war in 2022, and in March 2024, Russian presidential elections were conducted in South Ossetia and Abkhazia with overwhelming support for Putin.²⁵³ The voting was condemned as illegal by Georgia, the EU, and NATO’s Secretary General.²⁵⁴ Georgia applied for EU membership shortly after the outbreak of the war and was granted Candidate Status by the European Council on 14 December 2023.²⁵⁵ However, Russia’s war against Ukraine has not spilled over into Georgia yet, despite initial concerns. People in South Ossetia have even spoken of a remarkably calm period since 2022.²⁵⁶

II.Abkhazia

The Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia is located in the extreme west of Georgia on the coast of the Black Sea. Like South Ossetia, it has a direct border with Russia to the north. The region is limited on the northern and eastern sides by the Psou river and the Caucasian Mountains, in the south by the Inguri river, and in the west by the sea. The region covers 8665 square kilometres, which is more than twice the area of South Ossetia, and comprises 12.6% of Georgian — S. 44 —territory.²⁵⁷ More than 245,000 people live in the region, five times as many as in South Ossetia.²⁵⁸ Like Ossetians, Abkhazians are recognized as a people.²⁵⁹ The histories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are partly similar but also distinct in many aspects.

A.History

Like South Ossetia, Abkhazia is also inhabited by an ethnic group distinct from the Georgian ethnicity. The Abkhazians, or Apsua as they call themselves, are a western Caucasian ethnic group that played an important role in the cultural development of the Caucasus.²⁶⁰ According to the Abkhazian narrative, they are one of the earliest ethnic groups to inhabit the Caucasus, since the fifth century BC, whereas Georgians immigrated to the region later.²⁶¹ In contrast, Georgian historians assert that the region has been populated at least partially by Georgians since ancient times.²⁶² Like South Ossetia, the region has been invaded and influenced by various external powers throughout the centuries: Romans, Byzantines, Mongols, Ottomans, and Russians.²⁶³ Both regions have experienced several alternations between separation and unification in their territories and politics.²⁶⁴ Yet, in comparison to South Ossetia, Abkhazia was more powerful and autonomous, and at times even annexed parts of Georgia.²⁶⁵ Notably, the Abkhazian ruler Leon II ended the Byzantine rule over the country and united western Georgia in the 780s, calling it the Abkhazian kingdom.²⁶⁶ In the tenth century, Abkhazia was united with regions further to the east, forming the kingdom of Georgia.²⁶⁷ The Ottomans ruled Abkhazia and western Georgia from the mid-sixteenth century. They largely replaced Christianity, which had been introduced in the — S. 45 —sixth century,²⁶⁸ by Islam.²⁶⁹ Nevertheless, Abkhazia retained some autonomy under Ottoman rule.

When the Georgian King Erekle II and the Russian Empress Cathrine the Great concluded the Treaty of Georgievsk in 1783 to declare eastern Georgia, including South Ossetia, a Russian protectorate, Abkhazia was not affected.²⁷⁰ Only in 1810 was the region conquered and annexed by the Russian Empire.²⁷¹ Initially, Abkhazia retained a high degree of autonomy and was ruled by its traditional elites, unlike the regions to the east,²⁷² but over time, the Russian Empire gained more control over Abkhazia. It abolished local autonomy in 1864 and integrated Abkhazia into the Sukhumi district in 1883.²⁷³ Rebellions by Abkhazians against the Tsarist regime resulted in mass repressions and the expulsion of the mostly Muslim population to the Ottoman Empire, and Georgians, Armenians, Greeks, Russians, and others were invited to settle the newly vacant land.²⁷⁴

Following the Russian Revolution in 1917, the Bolsheviks founded the Abkhaz People’s Council to pave the way for establishing the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia.²⁷⁵ However, in 1918, the Democratic Republic of Georgia was proclaimed; this included the territory of Abkhazia, albeit with some autonomy.²⁷⁶ The Democratic Republic existed only until the Soviets invaded in 1921 and proclaimed the Soviet Socialist Republic of Georgia (Georgian SSR) and the Soviet Socialist Republic of Abkhazia (Abkhazian SSR).²⁷⁷ By establishing an independent Soviet Socialist Republic, Abkhazians sought protection from Soviet Russia against Georgia.²⁷⁸ Notably, Abkhazia’s status as a Soviet Socialist Republic was recognized by the Georgian SSR shortly after its proclamation.²⁷⁹ The Abkhazian SSR stressed its independence in article 5 of its Constitution of 1925,²⁸⁰ emphasizing its sovereignty and independence — S. 46 —from any other powers. However, the Union Treaty of 1922 united the Georgian and Abkhazian SSRs; this treaty entailed close military, political, and financial cooperation and left the foreign policy of both SSRs fully within Georgian competence.²⁸¹ In 1931, Abkhazia’s status was downgraded from that of an SSR to that of an autonomous republic within Georgia, and a process of Georgianization was rapidly implemented.²⁸² For example, the Latin alphabet of the Abkhazian language was replaced by the Georgian alphabet, Abkhaz-language schools were closed, and other ethnic groups were settled in Abkhazia.²⁸³ As a countermeasure, some compensatory measures for Abkhaz people, such as quotas in government and administrative positions, were implemented, but these were understood as discriminating against ethnic Georgians.²⁸⁴ In 1931, 1957, 1967, and 1977, Abkhazia prepared appeals to the leadership of the USSR for secession from the Georgian SSR, either to join the Russian SSR or to form a separate Abkhazian SSR.²⁸⁵

Throughout the Soviet era, relations between Georgia and Abkhazia were strained but not violent. Tensions were aggravated in 1989 when the USSR began to dissolve and Georgia moved towards independence.²⁸⁶ Abkhazia declared its state sovereignty on 25 August 1990, but this was judged invalid by Georgia.²⁸⁷ The sharp divide between the two camps again became apparent when Georgia held two referenda in early 1991 for either the preservation of the Soviet Union or the independence of Georgia. Whereas Abkhazia, like South Ossetia, voted to remain in the USSR, Georgia voted for independence, which it declared on 9 April 1991.²⁸⁸ After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Georgian territory was internationally recognized as including Abkhazia. Abkhazia declared secession and independence from Georgia on 23 July 1992, but this has not been recognized.²⁸⁹ In August 1992, Georgian troops entered Abkhazia, and a war broke out, leading to 8000–9000 deaths; some 250,000 people, mostly Georgians, being internally displaced; and gross human rights violations on both sides.²⁹⁰

The Moscow Agreement of 3 September 1992 recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity, called for a ceasefire, and declared the neutrality of Russian troops located in the area,²⁹¹ but the Agreement fell apart almost immediately.²⁹² In October 1992, Abkhazia, backed by volunteers from the North Caucasus and other parts of Russia, initiated an attack that resulted in a military defeat for Georgia: Abkhazia regained territory in the west, overcame its ‘sandwich position’ encircled by Georgia, and by consequence obtained a direct border with Russia.²⁹³ On 27 July 1993, an agreement was concluded on a ceasefire and monitoring arrangements.²⁹⁴ It forbade the introduction of further forces into the area, foresaw a Russian–Abkhaz–Georgian monitoring group, and provided for a joint commission by observers from the UN and CSCE. Subsequently, UNSC resolution 858 of 24 August 1993 established the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG), tasked with examining reports on ceasefire breaches and resolving incidents with involved parties.²⁹⁵ The mandate was prolonged until 2009 to allow time for a comprehensive political settlement, when Russia made use of its veto power in the UNSC and ended the mission.²⁹⁶ Further agreements have since been concluded, such as one in 1994 including the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons to Abkhazia and admitting that Abkhazia ‘shall have its own constitution, legislation, and appropriate state symbols such as an anthem, emblem and flag’.²⁹⁷ Moreover, the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation of Forces²⁹⁸ stationed a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force, composed solely of Russian soldiers, in the conflict zone, and this was subsequently bolstered by the UNSC.²⁹⁹ In comparison to South Ossetia, Abkhazia received — S. 48 —more international attention and involvement: the CIS and the UN were present, and Russia acted as a mediator.³⁰⁰

The war in August 2008 took place mainly in South Ossetia; however, Abkhazia also entered a phase of violence with Georgia that year. Abkhaz and Russian troops attacked the Georgian positions in the upper Kodori valley and established full control over the entire territory of the former Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.³⁰¹ The IIFFMCG found that this attack was a breach of the Agreement on a Ceasefire and Separation Forces of 1994, because the upper Kodori valley was not part of Abkhaz-controlled territory.³⁰² Consequently, the events were judged to breach the prohibition on the use of force in the sense of article 2(4) UN Charter³⁰³ and constituted an armed attack against Georgia in the sense of article 51 UN Charter.³⁰⁴ The justifications presented by the Abkhaz side referred to liberation of the Kodori Valley, safeguarding civilians against terrorist assaults, prevention of a Georgian offensive, and the need to establish a second front in line with the Treaty on Friendship and Cooperation with South Ossetia, but these were not considered lawful.³⁰⁵ As in South Ossetia, the five-day war in August 2008 officially ended with the EU-brokered Six-Point Ceasefire Agreement mentioned above. In contrast to South Ossetia in 2008, Abkhazia was not the target of an armed attack prohibited by international law immediately before being recognized as a state by Russia.³⁰⁶

As in the case of South Ossetia, an independent state of Abkhazia was not seriously discussed prior to 2008. No UN member state had recognized its independence before the war, whereas they and the UNSC had repeatedly referred to the territorial integrity of Georgia.³⁰⁷ However, acknowledgment became a topic of discussion after the war, and the countries that acknowledged South Ossetia’s independence did the same for Abkhazia: Russia and Nicaragua in 2008; Venezuela and Nauru in 2009; the microstates of Vanuatu and Tuvalu in 2011, which revoked their recognitions in 2013 and 2014, respectively; and Syria in 2018. Additionally, South Ossetia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh recognized — S. 49 —Abkhazia as an independent state.³⁰⁸ Notably, Abkhazia’s state-building process was more advanced than South Ossetia’s. It was considered a ‘statelike entity’ and a ‘stabilized de facto regime’ prior to the war in 2008.³⁰⁹ Consequently, recognition was refused by the international community ‘for political reasons only’, according to Nussberger.³¹⁰ However, arguably Abkhazia’s statelike quality has diminished since 2008, due to the subsequent conclusion of several agreements³¹¹ that make it more dependent on Russia, for instance for military cooperation, border surveillance, laws, and the economy.³¹² In 2020, a 45-point programme was introduced on the formation of a common social and economic space, which Georgia saw as another step to a de facto annexation of Abkhazia by Russia.³¹³ The agreement plans the harmonization of Abkhazian with Russian laws in social, economic, health, and political spheres.³¹⁴

B.Recent Developments

Until today, the conflict in Abkhazia remains unresolved, and the overall situation tense. Again, the region’s status is the core issue of the dispute: while Georgia claims its territorial integrity, bolstered by international law, the de facto state of Abkhazia insists on its independence, backed by Russia and a few other states. It is noteworthy that Russia’s role in Abkhazia has changed: whereas in the early 1990s it held a peacekeeping status, and even recognized Georgia’s territorial integrity in article 1 of the Moscow Agreement of 1992,³¹⁵ it later became the patron of the claims for self-determination from Abkhazia.³¹⁶ Peacekeepers were replaced by military troops of the seventh Military Base under agreement with Abkhazian leaders but without Georgia’s consent.³¹⁷ They are still present and exercise overall control over the separatist — S. 50 —armed groups.³¹⁸ Dependence on Russia remains in both financial and personal terms.³¹⁹ Through ‘passportization’, almost all Abkhazians have obtained Russian citizenship, which has effectively turned Abkhazia into a ‘Russian protectorate’.³²⁰ Thus, similarly to South Ossetia, recent developments have intensified relations and increased military, economic, political, and personal dependency on Russia.³²¹

As in the case of South Ossetia, the war in Ukraine has not spilled over to Abkhazia. However, the war once more clearly illustrated the conflict between Georgia, supported by the West, and the break-away region, supported by Russia. As mentioned above, both regions participated in Russia’s presidential elections in March 2024, while Georgia waits for EU membership.

III.Transnistria

The Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic, also referred to as Transnistria and as Transdniestria, comprises a strip of land in eastern Europe. The territory is separated from its parent state, Moldova, by the Dniester river: Moldova is located on the west of the river, Transnistria on the east, bordering Ukraine. Literally, trans-Dniester means across the Dniester river. The region encompasses 4163 square kilometres and comprises 12.3% of Moldova’s territory.³²² Its population is 465,000.³²³ The Transnistrian conflict contrasts with the previous two in terms of ethnicity: no Transnistrian people or language exists.³²⁴ The population and language is Moldovan for the most part, although with a higher proportion of Russians.³²⁵ The conflict concerns geopolitical preferences and social perceptions rather than ethnic or religious animosities.³²⁶ However, politicians on both sides emphasize the distinct history, language, and culture when attempting to justify their positions.³²⁷

A.History

Throughout the centuries, the strip of land that is Transnistria has undergone constant changes in affiliation and has been a crossroad of Russian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Jewish, and German cultures, a ‘classic borderland where ethnic identities have been fluid and situational’.³²⁸ From around the ninth and tenth centuries to the thirteenth century, Transnistria belonged to the Kievan Rus and the Galicia-Volhynia principality.³²⁹ In the fifteenth century, the Moldovan principality emerged under Ștefan (Stephen) the Great, who was able to defend the territory against Ottoman invasion and even enlarged the territory.³³⁰ Nevertheless, in the late sixteenth century the Moldovan principality fell under Ottoman rule.³³¹ After the Russo-Turkish war (1787–1791), the Peace Treaty of Iasi of 1791 designated the Dniester river as the dividing line between the Russian and the Ottoman Empire: the territory east of the river, including Transnistria, belonged to the Russian Empire, that to the west of it to the Ottoman Empire.³³² After the next Russo-Turkish war (1806–1812), which was concluded by the Treaty of Bucharest, the Russian Empire extended its reach and annexed territories to the west of the Dniester river.³³³ This land, to the west of the Dniester and to the east of the Prut, became known as Bessarabia.³³⁴ Although Transnistria and Bessarabia now both belonged to the Russian Empire, they developed quite differently: while Bessarabia remained a rural and agricultural area, Transnistria fell under strong Slavic influence and became urbanized and economically developed.³³⁵ Efforts to assimilate Bessarabia to Russia began to balance the differences: the local government was replaced and the Romanian language was replaced by Russian.³³⁶ However, after losing the Crimean War (1854–1856), Russia was forced to give up Bessarabia, which was included in the Kingdom of Romania established in 1859.³³⁷ The Treaty of Berlin of 1878 restored Bessarabia to Russia, — S. 52 —and the newly founded Romanian state received Dobruja in compensation.³³⁸ Moldova vanished from the map.³³⁹

Amid the turmoil of the Russian Revolution, Bessarabia’s and Transnistria’s paths separated again. Like many other provinces of Russia, Bessarabia sought independence, and its predominantly ethnic Romanian population aimed to join Romania.³⁴⁰ In contrast, Transnistria remained Russian and subsequently became part of the Soviet Union. In 1924, the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) was founded. It was an autonomous province of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and included Transnistria along with parts of today’s Ukraine.³⁴¹ Yet, during the Second World War, the east and west banks of the Dniester river were merged again. The Ribbentrop– Molotov Pact of 1939 transferred Bessarabia from Romania to the USSR. The ceded territory, together with the former MASSR, became the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (Moldavian SSR) in 1940.³⁴² To strengthen and legitimize the new nation, Soviet policy emphasized the distinction between Moldovans and Romanians.³⁴³ For instance, Soviet linguists were instructed to present fundamental differences between the Romanian and the Moldovan languages—findings that were criticized by scholars outside the USSR.³⁴⁴

Unified within the Moldavian SSR, Transnistria and Bessarabia shared both similarities and differences. Of course, both were infused with the same Soviet political culture, ruled by the same administrative centres, and incorporated into the Soviet economy.³⁴⁵ However, while Transnistria became a centre of the Soviet defence sector with heavy industries and military industrial complexes, Bessarabia developed as a centre of agriculture.³⁴⁶ Transnistria had a privileged status within the Moldavian SSR and played an important role that was disproportionate to its small size.³⁴⁷ Additionally, it experienced a greater degree of ‘Sovietization’ than Bessarabia, and due to its high concentration of military personnel, it was even considered one of the most Sovietized — S. 53 —territories within the USSR.³⁴⁸ Given the differences in social development, economic structure, and general importance within the USSR, by the end of the 1980s Transnistria and Bessarabia were two ‘increasingly distinct worlds’.³⁴⁹

In the late 1980s, the Moldovan national movement grew stronger, with an orientation towards Romania and away from Russia. In 1989, the parliament of the Moldavian SSR passed a series of language laws that declared the Moldovan language as the official state language and required the use of the Latin alphabet instead of the Cyrillic.³⁵⁰ This new legislation is widely regarded as a central factor leading to the outbreak of the conflict, since it was perceived as a suppression of the Russian language.³⁵¹ Moreover, the Moldavian Supreme Soviet adopted a flag and an anthem that were the same as Romania’s.³⁵² Not surprisingly, some called for reunification with Romania.³⁵³ Moldova declared its sovereignty on 23 June 1990 and its independence as the Republic of Moldova on 27 August 1991.³⁵⁴ Opposing Moldova’s emancipation from the Soviet Union, and fearing incorporation into Romania as the next step, Transnistria established the independent Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic in 1990.³⁵⁵ Gagauzia, a region in the south of Moldova, likewise proclaimed the Republic of Gagauzia. When parliaments and presidents were elected for these newly established entities, the central government in Chisinau declared these actions null and void.³⁵⁶

The situation escalated into a short war between Transnistria and Moldova from March to July 1992. The Russian Fourteenth Army, stationed in Transnistria since Soviet times, directly and indirectly supported the secessionists.³⁵⁷ Moreover, they were supported by Cossacks—an association recognized by Russian authorities³⁵⁸— and volunteer fighters from other parts of the Soviet Union.³⁵⁹ The fighting caused several hundred deaths and some 100,000 people becoming refugees.³⁶⁰ In contrast, the dispute in Gagauzia did not escalate — S. 54 —into violence, and in 1994, a special law adopted by Moldova granted the autonomous status of this region.³⁶¹ The result of the war in Transnistria was that the Moldovan central government in Chisinau lost control over the region that from now on formed a distinct administrative entity.³⁶² On 21 July 1992, a ceasefire agreement was concluded between Moldova and Russia promoting a peaceful solution to the armed conflict.³⁶³ The agreement provided for an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized security zone between the parties, implemented by a joint control committee involving Russia, Moldova, and Transnistria.³⁶⁴ In a joint statement, the presidents of Moldova and Russia outlined a set of principles that included respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Moldova, the need for a special status for Transnistria and the right of its population to decide on its own future if Moldova sought to reunite with Romania.³⁶⁵ Moreover, the parties agreed on the gradual withdrawal of the Russian Fourteenth Army.³⁶⁶

Since the ceasefire in 1992, the conflict has resulted in almost no further violence. However, the core issue of the status of Transnistria has not been resolved, despite many attempts. In 1993, the CSCE published Report Nr. 13, which offered a basis for future talks about a solution to the conflict: it proposed establishing a ‘Special Region of Transnistria with its own regional executive, elective assembly, and court’, but this region would remain an integral part of Moldova.³⁶⁷ Besides the CSCE, Russia, Ukraine, and the CIS have also repeatedly offered mediation without a solution being achieved. In 1997, for instance, the conflict parties signed the Moscow Memorandum on the normalization of the relations between the Republic of Moldova and the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.³⁶⁸ The document foresaw the establishment of a ‘common state’ within the borders of Moldavian SSR as of 1990.³⁶⁹ Yet the term ‘common state’ was not defined, which led to criticisms and distinct interpretations — S. 55 —of its meaning by the parties.³⁷⁰ The Memorandum failed, and according to Borgen, it was never submitted to the Moldovan Parliament for ratification and its status under Moldovan law was unclear.³⁷¹ It was followed by the Memorandum on the Basic Principles of the State Structure of a United State in Moldova, also called the Kozak Plan, which envisaged a federal state structure and was a near-resolution. However, the plan failed in the last minute, and negotiations on the issue of final political status had turned into a prolonged deadlock.³⁷² The OSCE, EU, and US are reported to have opposed the plan, fearing it would formalize the status quo and hinder Moldova’s future as a viable European state.³⁷³ Thus, in the absence of any basis on which to negotiate the status of Transnistria, both sides, with the OSCE Mission to Moldova, began to concentrate on confidence and security building measures.³⁷⁴ The discussions included not only Transnistria, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and the OSCE, but also the EU and the US, a format that has hence been called 5 + 2. Since 2016, modest progress has been made in implementing such confidence-building and integration measures, mediated by the OSCE and accepted by both sides.³⁷⁵ Transnistria’s right to external self-determination has been dismissed and has been seriously discussed only in the case that Moldova surrenders its statehood or merges with Romania.³⁷⁶ Until today, Transnistria has not been recognized as a state by any other state, not even by Russia, only by its allies South Ossetia and Abkhazia.³⁷⁷

B.Recent Developments

Although Transnistria has not experienced outbreaks of violence since the war in 1992, its status remains unresolved. International law and the international community protect Moldova’s territorial integrity, including the east bank of the Dniester. However, Transnistria insists on its statehood and has a de facto government, parliament, president, military power, and constitution.

There is no desire among the population to change this and reunite.³⁷⁸ Like South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Transnistria’s putative state is dependent on the support of Russia in many respects.³⁷⁹ Russia still has military personnel and ammunition there that belonged to the Fourteenth Army in Soviet times and ought to have been withdrawn according to various agreements.³⁸⁰ These troops remain without Moldova’s consent and despite international calls for their withdrawal.³⁸¹ The situation is considered an occupation, except for Russia’s peacekeeping contingent, which is present with Moldova’s consent.³⁸² The ECtHR has repeatedly found that Russia exercises effective control over the territory, as will be discussed below in Part III (chapter III, C, 1).

Financially, Transnistria profits, for example, from the subsidy of free gas provided by the Russian gas giant Gazprom. Debts resulting from the free use of gas by Transnistria throughout the last decade are estimated at between 6 and 7.5 billion US dollars.³⁸³ Despite its dependence on Russia, Transnistria is much less isolated economically or socially than South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It has an export market for industrial plants and light industry and certainly also benefits from Moldova’s trade agreement with the EU, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) that began operating in 2014.³⁸⁴ Transnistria’s social and cultural life benefits from a high level of contact between people east and west of the Dniester. Because Transnistria has never closed its borders, people can always travel to both Moldova and Ukraine.³⁸⁵

Since Russia started the war against Ukraine in 2022, the relative stability of the situation in Transnistria has been more threatened than in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Its geographical location speaks for itself. In April 2022, a Russian commander announced a plan to establish a corridor from Russianoccupied eastern Ukraine through Odessa to Transnistria.³⁸⁶ Fears of a spillover — S. 57 —of the war into Transnistria and attacks by Russia on Moldova have been expressed by the Moldovan government in Chisinau.³⁸⁷ Explosions,³⁸⁸ an attack on the de facto ministry of the interior,³⁸⁹ the murder of a politician,³⁹⁰ and drone attacks on a military base³⁹¹ all illustrate that the situation is tense and risky, especially because the originators of these events remain unidentified. What is sure is that the war has brought Moldova closer to the West; the EU granted it Candidate Status for membership in 2022.³⁹² Transnistria is in a tricky position, being clearly allied with Russia but having always fostered deep ties with Ukraine, especially in the economic sphere.³⁹³

IV.Nagorno-Karabakh

The Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh or Republic of Artsakh, simply termed Nagorno-Karabakh, covered a landlocked mountainous region in the Caucasus that contained 3170 square kilometres and thus was smaller than the other three regions.³⁹⁴ It was entirely surrounded by Azerbaijan, and only the Lachin Corridor connected the territory to its patron state, Armenia. The population of the region was Armenian³⁹⁵ and totalled 120,000 people in 2022.³⁹⁶ This conflict has been judged the most dangerous of the four cases, considering that it saw repeated escalations of violence in recent years.³⁹⁷ Both Azerbaijan and Armenia were in a perpetual state of military readiness.³⁹⁸ In September 2023, Azerbaijan, which Nagorno-Karabakh had always — S. 58 —legally belonged to, regained control over the territory in a short war. In January 2024, the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh officially ceased to exist, and the de facto and the de jure status of the region now coincide. Therefore, we no longer consider Nagorno-Karabakh a frozen conflict. However, for three decades it was one, which is why it remains relevant to our analysis. Unless otherwise specified, statements about and analysis of this conflict refer to the period before September 2023.

A.History

Armenian and Azerbaijani historians both consider the region of Nagorno-Karabakh as an integral part of their culture and nation and thus have diverging views of its history.³⁹⁹ Armenian scholars argue that the original inhabitants were Armenians and that the region was part of the Armenian kingdom from the first century BC.⁴⁰⁰ In contrast, Azerbaijani scholars stress that the Armenian King Tigran II relinquished most of the territory and that by the end of the first century BC it formed part of Caucasia Albania, from which Azeris descend.⁴⁰¹ According to the Azerbaijani view, Armenians portray an idealized picture of the Armenian kingdom that is contrary to reality.⁴⁰² What is clear is that in the history of Nagorno-Karabakh, like in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, various empires have clashed throughout the centuries. It, too, has been home to many ethnic groups and religions. From the third to the thirteenth centuries, Karabakh was under frequently changing rule by groups such as the Caucasian Albanians, Arabs, Turks, and Mongols.⁴⁰³ During the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries, it was the arena for continuous wars between Iran and Turkey.⁴⁰⁴ In the mid-eighteenth century, Panah Ali-Khan founded the Karabakh Khanate and ruled it under Persian suzerainty.⁴⁰⁵ In 1805, Russia gained control over the Karabakh Khanate, and after a war against Persia (1804–1813), the treaty of Gulistan formally ceded the land to the Tsar.⁴⁰⁶ Local principalities were absorbed into the Tsarist administrative system by dividing them into large provinces, highly heterogeneous ethnically but convenient for the governance and maintenance of economic — S. 59 —units.⁴⁰⁷ The settlement of a second war between Russia and Persia (1826– 1828) incorporated today’s eastern Armenia and today’s northern Azerbaijan into the Russian Empire, leading to mass immigration of Armenians into the Karabakh region.⁴⁰⁸

After the Russian Revolution, the Caucasus disintegrated into the three independent republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. At that time, only the external borders with Turkey and Persia were clearly defined, whereas the borders between the three entities remained ambiguous, becoming an issue of dispute in the following years.⁴⁰⁹ Territorial claims were based on two principles: first, the administrative divisions of Tsarist times were kept because they had functioning administrations and strong economic connections, regardless of ethnic heterogeneity; second, areas with related minority groups in neighbouring regions were also claimed, regardless of economic ties or access issues.⁴¹⁰ In Karabakh, these two principles collided, and therefore both Azerbaijan and Armenia claimed it for themselves.⁴¹¹ Armenians predominated in the highlands of Karabakh, Azeris in the plains.⁴¹² Due to geography, the Karabakh highlands were much more easily accessible from Baku in the east than from Erevan in the west.⁴¹³ These facts resulted in the integration of Karabakh into the Republic of Azerbaijan, provisionally in 1919 and finally at the Paris Peace Conference in 1920.⁴¹⁴ The process was accompanied by several rebellions by Karabakh Armenians. Large-scale clashes culminated in the war of 1919– 1920.⁴¹⁵ In 1921, the Bolsheviks occupied Transcaucasia, and in 1923, the Soviet authorities established the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO), still inhabited mainly by Armenians, within the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic (Azerbaijani SSR).⁴¹⁶ The oblast did not have any border with the Armenian SSR, because the Azerbaijan SSR surrounded the region completely.

The ensuing decades were relatively peaceful. But during Perestroika, autonomy movements within the USSR also arose in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the situation became tense. At that time, the population of NKAO consisted of 77% Armenians and 22% Azeris, with Russian and Kurdish minorities, whilst — S. 60 —in the bordering region of Lachin, also part of the Azerbaijani SSR, the opposite was the case: Azeris and Turks comprised the majority, and only 5–6% were Armenians.⁴¹⁷ In 1988, demonstrations took place in Stepanakert, the capital of NKAO, and in Yerevan for NKAO’s secession from Azerbaijan and its incorporation into Armenia.⁴¹⁸ This request was also brought to the Supreme Soviets of the Armenian SSR, the Azerbaijani SSR, and the USSR; however, only the Armenian SSR supported the unification.⁴¹⁹ Consequently, the demonstrations escalated, leading to many deaths and hundreds of thousands becoming refugees on both the Armenian and the Azerbaijani side.⁴²⁰ Following the violent escalations, the NKAO was temporarily placed under the direct rule of Moscow in 1989.⁴²¹ When control was returned to Azerbaijan a few months later, the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR and the Nagorno-Karabakh Regional Council adopted a joint resolution on the reunification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.⁴²² In the early 1990s, the conflict escalated again, and as a consequence Soviet troops arrived in Nagorno-Karabakh to place it under a state of emergency and occasionally intervened in violent confrontations between Azeris and Armenians.⁴²³

On 31 August 1991, both Azerbaijan and Armenia declared independence from the collapsing USSR.⁴²⁴ Just two days later, Nagorno-Karabakh proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh, which was rejected by Azerbaijan.⁴²⁵ With the withdrawal of the Soviet army in December 1991, military control over Nagorno-Karabakh was handed over to the Karabakh Armenians.⁴²⁶ The conflict ‘gradually escalated into a full-scale war’ in 1992 and spilled over into other parts of Azerbaijan, where forces of Armenian ethnicity conquered the Azerbaijani districts of Lachin, Kelbajar, Jebrayil, Gubadly, and Zangilan and substantial parts of Agdam and Fizuli.⁴²⁷ The war caused approximately 25,000 deaths and the displacement of over one million refugees on both sides.⁴²⁸

The ceasefire agreement of 5 May 1994, named the Bishkek Protocol, was signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh following Russian mediation and set an end to the war.⁴²⁹ However, this agreement was repeatedly breached over the years along the borders, causing many deaths.⁴³⁰ The UNSC unanimously adopted a series of resolutions in 1993 that reaffirmed the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan, condemned the occupation of the territory by Armenian forces, and demanded their unconditional withdrawal.⁴³¹ Negotiations for a resolution to the conflict have been conducted by the OSCE and the Minsk Group, co-chaired by Russia, France, and the US. They have repeatedly presented bases for future negotiations, for instance at the OSCE summit in Lisbon in 1996⁴³² and at the summit in Madrid in 2007. The latter established a set of basic principles, the Madrid Recommendations for future settlement, including the return of the territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control, an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh providing guarantees for security and self-governance, a corridor linking Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh, future determination of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally binding expression of will, the right of all internally displaced persons and refugees to return to their homes, and international security guarantees including a peacekeeping operation.⁴³³ Despite the optimistic signals and updated versions of the Recommendations being presented at the three ensuing summits at Muskoka (2010), Deauville (2011), and Los Cabos (2012), no tangible progress was achieved in clarifying the status of Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴³⁴ In sum, the OSCE’s negotiating processes were without success, and renewed outbreaks of violence could not be avoided.

In 2014 and 2015, tensions intensified, and fighting started again, leading to a four-day war in April 2016 at the line of separation with hundreds of casualties on both sides.⁴³⁵ For the first time since 1994, Azerbaijan conquered some of its formal territory. Russia managed to mediate a ceasefire. Indeed, Russia has been the main mediator in this conflict, not only within the framework of — S. 62 —the OSCE negotiations but also in trilateral settings with the two conflict parties. Presidential meetings were held in Moscow in 2008, in Kazan in 2011, and in Sochi in 2012. However, Russia’s agenda in this conflict has remained unclear,⁴³⁶ in contrast to the situations in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria. Traditionally it is the power protecting Armenia, but it has, for example, sold weapons to both sides.⁴³⁷

In September 2020, intense violence broke out again and led to the second Karabakh war. For almost three decades, the conflict had not caused as much bloodshed; the 2020 outbreak resulted in the deaths of 7,000 military personnel and 170 civilians.⁴³⁸ Azerbaijan sought to recover the territory.⁴³⁹ Again, Russia brokered a ceasefire between Armenia and Azerbaijan, on 10 November 2020.⁴⁴⁰ Under the agreement, the districts of Agdam, Kalbajar, and Lachin were returned to Azerbaijan. Due to their weaker military position, Nagorno-Karabakh and its patron state Armenia had very limited options. Furthermore, the agreement deployed Russian ‘peacemaking forces’ along the contact line and the Lachin corridor.⁴⁴¹ The Lachin corridor guaranteed a connection between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, controlled by the Russian ‘peacemaking forces’.⁴⁴² In contrast to the other three cases, only in 2020 were Russian forces deployed. Russia had offered this repeatedly since 1994 but had been rejected each time by Azerbaijan, Armenia, and/or the Karabakh Armenians.⁴⁴³ They feared Russian military domination in the region, the undermining of sovereignty, and increasing dependence on Moscow.⁴⁴⁴

B.Recent Developments

The initial situation of Nagorno-Karabakh was similar to the three cases previously presented: ever since the proclamation of the Nagorno-Karabakh — S. 63 —Republic in 1991, the de facto state had existed outside the political and legal control of Azerbaijan, to which the territory belonged under international law.⁴⁴⁵ It was politically, legally, economically, militarily, and culturally connected with and dependent on a third state, Armenia. For instance, the ECtHR found that Armenia wielded effective control over Nagorno-Karabakh in the Chiragov case and emphasized the integration of the two entities in virtually all important matters.⁴⁴⁶ The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe noted the occupation by Armenian forces of ‘considerable parts of the territory of Azerbaijan’ in 2005 when it reaffirmed that the secession or independence of an entity cannot be achieved by de facto annexation by Armenia.⁴⁴⁷ Moreover, Nagorno-Karabakh has never been recognized as an independent state by any other state, not even by its patron state Armenia. Only South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria recognized its independence.

Yet, recent developments have radically changed the situation. After the second Karabakh war in 2020, the ceasefire agreement mentioned above concluded that Armenian forces were to be withdrawn from Nagorno-Karabakh simultaneously with the deployment of Russian peacekeeping forces. According to the ICG, this happened within two weeks of the ceasefire agreement, and Armenia also halted military supplies to Nagorno-Karabakh.⁴⁴⁸ Despite other ties with Nagorno-Karabakh, from this moment it was questionable whether Armenia still was in effective control over the region.⁴⁴⁹ Violence erupted repeatedly in the following two years. In summer 2023, Nagorno-Karabakh experienced a humanitarian crisis due to shortages of food, fuel, and medical supplies following Azerbaijan’s blockade of the Lachin corridor. Although the UNSC held an emergency session at Armenia’s request, it failed to pass a resolution.⁴⁵⁰ On 19 September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a military operation including heavy bombing and a ground offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh and gained control within 24 hours, thus ending three decades of de — S. 64 —facto rule.⁴⁵¹ Within one week, more than 100,000 refugees arrived in Armenia.⁴⁵² Russia started to withdraw its peacekeepers in April 2024.⁴⁵³ For these reasons, the current situation in Nagorno-Karabakh differs from those in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Transnistria and is no longer considered a frozen conflict.